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1. Introduction 
Since World War II, the developing countries have made extensive efforts, including aid 
and technical support and policy advices, to help the poor countries escape from poverty. 
A variety of strategies were proposed and implemented by the experts of international 
development organizations and advanced countries. With a few exceptions many 
developing countries, however, still suffer from severe poverty.  
Most of the development strategies recommended by the experts of the advanced 
economies are implicitly and explicitly derived from their own experiences of 
industrialization and development in the past. We should admit, however, that we do not 
understand well enough when, how, and what part of the experiences of the advanced 
economies, if any, are applicable to developing countries. 
The economic development of South Korea in the second half of the 20th century stands 
out as one of the few exceptional success episodes. Being the most recent and vivid case 
of economic development, it has inspired other developing countries to learn from and 
to benchmark the South Korean development experiences.  
In response to the demand from the developing countries, Korean government has 
already established the Korean International Development Agency (KOICA) and has 
been helping them with financial resources and technical advices.  Korea Development 
Institute (KDI), which has been the think-tank in the process of Korean economic 
development, has initiated the Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) in order to share the 
experiences of Korea and to find resolutions for the problems that the developing 
countries face. Even some local governments of Korea take the initiative of 
disseminating the experiences in community renovation, called ‘the New Village 
Movement (Saemaeul Movement),’ in the developing countries.  
Unfortunately, however, we should admit that we do not have an agreement on what is 
the model of South Korea’s development. We know even less about what part of Korean 
experiences may be applicable to developing countries under what conditions and 
contexts. As Kim(2011) pointed out, “even before scholars were ready to agree on the 
model of South Korean development cooperation, practitioners in official development 
assistance (ODA) agencies have begun to ‘export’ the South Korean development 
model.”  
This study is an effort to fill this gap between academia and practice. In particular, we 
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investigate how aid was provided to South Korea and how the Korean government 
managed aid in the 1950s and the 1960s. Then, we explore what part of those 
experiences of South Korea is transferrable to contemporary Uganda. The choice of 
Uganda as the case under investigation is random.  
When G20 meeting was held in Seoul 2010, South Korea attracted the attention of the 
World as it was featured by a country that transformed itself to a donor from one of the 
poorest countries that received massive aid half a century ago. By contrast, Uganda has 
been one of the poorest in the world ever since independence in 1962. With aid flows 
averaging over 10% of GDP or more than a half of the public expenditure, Uganda is 
one of countries that receive the largest aid for budget support. 
It is absolutely true that South Korea could not have escaped from dire poverty if the 
US and the international society had not provided the massive aid. But at the same time 
it is equally true that if the Korea had misused and wasted aid, such a remarkable 
transformation in a relatively short period of time would not have been possible. 
Gunnar Myrdal(1985), who used to be the strong protagonist for the aid to the 
developing countries, had once lamented that in most developing countries the aid 
resources are appropriated by a few upper-class elites and the poor of those countries 
are taken hostages to extract more aid from developed countries. Korea, obviously, was 
an exception.  
There is little doubt that aid is essential for priming the pump of development of a poor 
country. More often than not, however, aid fails to deliver the intended results. 
Doucuoliagos et al. (2008) shows that there is hardly any empirical evidence for aid 
contributing to the economic growth of recipient countries. After a series of mistakes 
and failures over more than half a century, it is widely understood by now that both the 
donors and the recipients of aid should make coordinated efforts in order to make aid 
effective. In the 2005 Paris Forum, the international society made an agreement on how 
to improve the aid effectiveness and declared five principles of ownership, alignment, 
harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability. In order to monitor and 
encourage the implementation of the principles, twelve goals were set to be achieved by 
2010. When OECD evaluated how much the goals of Paris Declaration was achieved, 
however, they found that only one of the twelve goals was met by 2010. (OECD(2011)) 
It is even more startling is that OECD evaluation reports that aid often damaged the 
recipient countries instead of helping them.  
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This is exactly the reason why the South Korean experiences are considered rare and 
valuable. Because aid was vitally important resource for economic development of 
Korea in the 1950s and the 1960s, the comprehension of how aid was managed and 
allocated is the essential part of understanding the Korean success story.  
Figure 1 The Paris Declaration Pyramid: Five shared principles with actions to make aid 
more effective  
 
Source: OECD (2011) 
If any developing country that receives a large amount of aid wants to emulate the 
South Korean success story, it is prerequisite to manage the aid resources effectively. 
Since Uganda became independent in 1962 it has been one of the world's poorest 
countries. Under the leadership of Museveni, who came in power in 1986, the Ugandan 
politics and economy has been stabilized compared to those under the previous regimes. 
Recently, Uganda has been praised for its transparent and efficient management of aid. 
The possibility of Uganda escaping from the poverty trap hangs on how effectively the 
government of Uganda manages aid and how effectively donors coordinate their effort 
in line with the needs of Uganda. In this study, we examine what Uganda can learn from 
the Korean experiences of aid management. However, it should be scrutinized whether 
those lessons from Korean experiences are implementable in the political and economic 
context of Uganda.  
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In chapter 2, we trace out the history of aid to South Korea in the 1950s and the 1960s, 
paying attention to the motivations of the decision makers of the donor and the 
recipients. We also analyze how the incentive structure of donor and recipient changed 
over time as the economic and political surroundings evolved. 
In chapter 3, we derive the lessons for developing countries in general from the Korean 
experiences in the 1950s and the 1960s related to aid management. Especially we 
evaluate how effective aid management was in Korea from the perspective of Paris 
Declaration. We identify the issues in which the US and South Korea shared the 
common interest and the issues for which they had conflicting ideas. We try to 
understand who took the initiative of what issues and how the implementation of policy 
proceeded.  
In chapter 4, we try to understand what lessons Uganda may learn from Korean 
experiences by contrasting the ways that the aid resources were handled in South Korea 
in the 1950s and the 1960s with that in contemporary Uganda. that are actually 
applicable to Uganda.  
We expect that this research will shed light on the question of why it is difficult for 
developing economies to emulate the successful precedents and what should be done to 
improve such possibility. 
In chapter4, we compare how the aid was allocated into different uses in South Korea 
and Uganda in those periods that we look into.   
Finally, in chapter 5 we identify the lessons from Korea for Uganda and evaluate 
whether they are applicable to the political and economic context of Uganda.  
 
2.  Aid to South Korea in the 1950s and the 1960s 
1) Overall Picture  
The major donor of aid to South Korea was the US. Korea became an object of 
American attention not so much because of “strategic considerations of the highest 
order,” but because it was an important test case in the cold war, like Greece and Turkey, 
a state perched on the fault lines of the new global conflict, threatened both from 
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without and within. Containment as Truman and Acheson conceived of it was not 
primarily military, but rather founded on a developmental theory that assumed a direct 
correlation between political stability (absence of communism) and economic growth. 
Dean Acheson and the State Department determined that successful American 
ministrations in Korea were essential to the prestige and credibility of American foreign 
policy, which, in turn, joined power and plenty in a cold war developmental effort.  
(Woo(1991), p.49) The role of the US in South Korea was twofold; The US provided 
security to South Korea by stationing the armed forces in South Korea; It provided an 
extraordinarily large amount of aid to South Korea for relief and reconstruction. 
Table 1 Economic and Military Aid to South Korea, 1945~1969* 
(Million US dollars) 
Year Economic Aid Military Aid Total 
1945 1,363 615 1,978 
1946 5,355 110 5,465 
1947 5,666 43 5,709 
1948 4,944 326 5,270 
1949 5,436 216 5,651 
1950 3,630 524 4,154 
1951 3,159 1,478 4,637 
1952 2,379 2,664 5,043 
1953 2,076 4,268 6,345 
1954 1,750 3,431 5,181 
1955 2,237 2,672 4,909 
1956 2,318 2,634 4,951 
1957 2,586 2,483 5,070 
1958 2,559 2,368 4,926 
1959 1,892 2,031 3,923 
1960 2,625 1,812 4,437 
1961 2,558 1,518 4,076 
1962 2,784 1,630 4,414 
1963 2,043 1,721 3,764 
1964 1,889 1,485 3,374 
1965 2,553 1,200 3,753 
1966 2,340 900 3,240 
1967 2,800 700 3,500 
1968 2,160 510 2,675 
1969 1,380 375 1,755 
Total 70,482 37,714 108,200 
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* Aid includes both grants and loans. 
Source: Data for 1945~1962 are from Kim, Taekyoon (2011) and data for 1963~1969 are from 
Bank of Korea (1969).  
The original plan to establish a unified government in Korea by 1948 was aborted as the 
presidential election was boycotted by Kim, Il-Sung in North Korea. As a consequence, 
in North Korea a dictatorial communist regime led by Kim, Il-Sung was established, 
while in South Korea a democratic capitalist regime led by the President Rhee, 
Syngman was established. The strong support of the USA helped Syngman Rhee win 
the presidential election in 1948 despite his meager base of political support within 
Korea. The major reason why the USA supported Rhee was that he placed the highest 
priority on the anti-communism. To Rhee, anti-communism overruled anything 
including establishing a unified country. This is how Korea became the frontier of the 
Cold War.  Even though the Cold War was over a long time ago, the military and 
ideological confrontation between North and South Korea continues until now.  
Thus, the dominant donor of aid to South Korea was the US, not the international 
organizations such as UN or World Bank. As shown in Table 1, about one third of aid 
provided to South Korea during 1954~1974 was military aid. But the US military aid to 
South Korea decreased sharply in the second half of the 1960s as the US was bogged 
down in Vietnam War. Economic aid, including grants and loans, on the other hand, 
continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s. But it was made clear that economic aid 
would be terminated sometime in the future. In the 1960s, the major portion of aid was 
loans, whereas grants were the dominant form of aid in the 1950s.  
Table 2 Summary of Official Economic Grants to South Korea by Donor  
(Thousand US dollars) 
Year 
USA UN 
Total 
GARIOA 
ECA  
(SEC) AID
* PL480 CRIK** UNKRA 
1945 4,934 - - - - - 4,934 
1946 49,496 - - - - - 49,496 
1947 175,371 - - - - - 175,371 
1948 179,593  - - - - 179,593 
1949 92,703 23,806 - - - - 116,509 
1950 - 49,330 - - 9,376 - 58,706 
1951 - 31,972 - - 74,448 122 106,542 
1952 - 3,824 - - 155,534 1,969 161,327 
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1953 - 232 5,571 - 158,787 29,580 194,170 
1954 - - 82,437 - 50,191 21,291 153,925 
1955 - - 205,815 - 8,711 22,181 236,707 
1956 - - 271,019 32,955 331 22,390 326,705 
1957 - - 323,268 45,522 - 14,103 382,893 
1958 - - 265,629 47,896 - 7,747 321,272 
1959 - - 208,297 11,436 - 2,471 222,204 
1960 - - 225,236 19,913 - 244 245,393 
1961 - - 154,319 44,926 - - 199,245 
1962   165,002 67,308   232,310 
1963   119,659 96,787   216,446 
1964   88,346 60,985   149,331 
1965   71,904 59,537   131,441 
1966   65,310 37,951   103,261 
1967   52,640 44,378   97,018 
1968   49,929 55,297   105,856 
1969   32,434 74,830   107,264 
1970   20,933 61,703   82,636 
1971   17,566 33,651   51,217 
1972   5,089    5,089 
1973   2,146    2,146 
*AID includes FOA and ICA aid; **CRIK includes SUN and SKO. 
Source: Bank of Korea and Federation of Korean Industries, various years 
Table 2 shows the official economic grants provided to South Korea by various agencies 
from 1945 to 1973. The total economic grant received by South Korea until 1961 
amounted 3.1 billion US dollars. The amount of economic aid had decreased gradually 
throughout the 1960s and the total economic aid from 1962 to 1973 was 1.3 billion US 
dollars. Immediately after the independence, the US aid was provided by GARION 
(Government Appropriation for Relief in Occupied Area) or ECA (Economic 
Cooperation Agency). In the mid-1950s, the operation of US aid to South Korea was 
taken over by ICA and then by AID in the early 1960s. From 1956, food aid started 
under PL480. During the Korea War and for some years afterward, UN provided aid to 
South Korea; CRIK (Civil Relief in Korea) and UNKRA(UN Korean Reconstruction 
Agency) were the major vehicles that implemented UN aid to South Korea. Most of the 
funds for UN aid to South Korea came from the US. US, who realized that it was not 
easy to coordinate the UN aid operation in South Korea in the direction that it sees 
desirable, gave up supporting aid to Korea via UN agencies.  
8 
 
The fiscal revenue depended critically on aid. The “counterpart fund” is the government 
revenue raised by selling the in-kind aid to the private sector. Table 3 shows that the 
counterpart fund had been the single most important source of the government income 
until the mid-1960s. The dependence of the government budget on the counterpart fund 
had decreased sharply in the second half of the 1960s.  By 1969, only eight percent of 
the government income came from aid. At the peak, 52.9 percent of the government 
revenue was financed by the counterpart fund in 1957.  
Table 3 Structure of Government Revenue, South Korea, 1953~1969,   (%) 
Year Tax Monopoly Profit 
Other 
Business 
Revenue 
Deposit/ 
Interest 
Income 
Miscel-
laneous Bond Loan 
Counterpart 
Fund Total 
1953 31.3 6.0 10.2 10.5 30.1 11.9 100.0 
1954 34.8 3.9 4.9 10.9 15.5 30.0 100.0 
1955 34.1 3.2 5.9 10.2 - 46.5 100.0 
1957 27.3 3.8 3.2 - 0.0 10.6 2.2 52.9 100.0 
1958 30.1 4.4 3.7 - - 5.6 4.7 51.5 100.0 
1959 47.4 5.0 3.1 - - 1.6 1.4 41.5 100.0 
1960 51.5 4.7 5.0 - - 2.5 1.7 34.6 100.0 
1961 37.8 4.3 9.4 - 2.3 6.0 1.0 39.2 100.0 
1962 30.3 4.5 7.3 1.2 3.8 18.0 4.1 30.8 100.0 
1963 40.9 6.4 10.1 1.7 2.1 3.6 0.6 34.6 100.0 
1964 47.2 5.7 7.5 2.2 2.1 - - 35.3 100.0 
1965 51.8 3.4 7.0 2.2 1.4 - - 34.2 100.0 
1966 57.4 4.9 7.2 5.4 - - - 25.1 100.0 
1967 64.9 5.1 5.9 6.1 0.0 - - 18.0 100.0 
1968        11.8  
1969        8.0  
Source: Economic Planning Board (1963), Bank of Korea (1968, 1969) 
 
2) The US aid to South Korea in the 1950s 
As Table 4 shows, in the 1950s the largest part of economic aid was provided for the 
urgent relief of the poverty-struck Korean people. Although the State Department of US 
pronounced the importance of economic development of South Korea in the geopolitical 
context of East Asia, when persuading the parliament for the provision of economic aid 
to South Korea, it was rhetoric rather than an actual goal, at least in the 1950s. To 
recover the Japanese economy, the US wanted the Korean government to purchase the 
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goods and services from Japan with the US aids money.1 For that reason, the US was 
not interested in the import-substitution industrialization (ISI) of Korean economy, 
which it often tolerated with or even encouraged in the case of other developing 
countries, such as Philippines, Turkey, and Argentina.  
It was because the logic of regional recovery placed Japan at the core of trade and the 
centerpiece of American East Asian policy. This meant that Korea had to be a market for 
Japanese goods, with open trade and export promotion (of agricultural goods and not 
ISI) as Korea’s overall economic policy.  
Table 4 Characteristics of Major Aid to South Korea in the 1950s 
Aid Agency Goal Period Amount (mil. US $) Items Provided 
FOA (USA) 
Economic 
stabilization and 
reconstruction 
1953.8 ~ 
1955.6 206 
Food, agricultural 
equipments, raw 
materials, industrial 
facilities 
ICA(USA) Reconstruction and fiscal stabilization 
1955.7 ~ 
1961.12 153 
Manufactured goods, raw 
materials, transportation 
equipments 
PL480 
(USA) 
Food supply and 
urgent relief 
1956 ~ 
1969 82 
Wheat, cotton, corns, 
animal fat 
CRIK (UN) Security and urgent relief 
1950.8 ~ 
1954.6 457 
Foods, medical 
equipments, agricultural 
products, medicine 
UNKRA 
(UN) 
Reconstruction and 
relief 
1950.12 ~ 
1960.6 122 
Equipments for 
reconstructing 
manufacturing, power 
plants, transportation 
facilities, housing and 
structures for education, 
grains and fertilizers 
Source: Park, Jin-Keun (2009) 
Woo(1991) pointed out that the US wanted South Korea to become two different things; 
in the context of the containment policy, it wanted Korea to become a strong state at the 
frontier of cold war which is capable of controlling the threats from within; and at the 
same time, in the context of regional economic recovery policy, the US wanted Korea to 
                                            
1 The United States spent close to $3 billion in Japan for Korean War and war-related supplies between 
1950 and 1954. Japan was living to a great extent off US expenditures for the prosecution of the Korean 
War. After the truce in Korea, the problem was the viability of the Japanese economy in the absence of the 
market of the Japanese products. 
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become a liberal decentralized market economy with a small, if not weak, government, 
depending on Japan for the industrial products. There lied an inherent contradiction in 
the US policy objectives for South Korea.  
Rhee took advantage of this contradiction. He would build a strong state as the US 
wished. But he would not use the strength of the state only to contain the Communists 
and to achieve the political stability in Korea but also to industrialize the economy.  
President Rhee criticized that the US is trying to recycle their aid money by giving it to 
Korea but actually supporting the Japanese industries. Rhee insisted on banning United 
Nations Rehabilitation Agencies order for Japan. Sabotaging the advices of the aid 
agencies, Rhee turned to ISI and did not made serious efforts to calm down the soaring 
inflation.  
Rhee understood well how the political system in the US worked and he was good at 
inducing the US to provide a large amount of aid. He believed and claimed that the US 
should pay for the sacrifice of Korean people who were put at the Cold War frontier, 
blocking the expansion of the Communists. Rhee’s bargaining chip against the US was 
demand for the reunification of Korea. In addition, his tactic for maximizing aid in 
dollar terms was the over-valued Korean currency. Though the US constantly pressured 
Korea to depreciate the Korean currency to the market rate, Rhee managed successfully 
to keep the exchange rate low.  
Because Rhee presumed that the US aid would continue to provide the raw materials 
and the foods, he came to the conclusion that what South Korea needed to pursue ISI. 
His pursuit of ISI was motivated by the realization that the US foreign policy 
framework would leave Korea as an economy subordinate to Japan. Against the US 
wishes Rhee used the US aid to industrialize the Korean economy instead of spending 
them on importing Japanese products. Because the security concern was far more 
important than everything else in 1950s, his firm adherence to the political and military 
alliance with the US maintained strong support of the US despite his pursuit of 
economic policies deviant from the US interest.  
This type of maneuver was possible, partly because a large portion of aid was provided 
as grants in the 1950s. This is shown in Table 5. Although in principle Rhee had the 
leverage for controlling the resources as he wished, a considerable portion of the 
counterpart fund in reality was tied up with the reconstruction and development projects 
prescribed in Taska Report in 1953, Electricity Development Three-Year Plan of 1953, 
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Nathan Plan of 1954, Small and Medium sized Enterprise Promotion Policy of 1956, 
and the manufacturing Industry Development Policy of 1957. (Yi et al. (2011)) In 
addition, the US monitored the implementation of the agreed policies by Korean 
government through the Combined Economic Board (CEB). In order to procure the 
resources for ISI and to acquire the autonomy in economic policy, Rhee had the Bank of 
Korea and all the commercial banks under his control. Printing money was an important 
financial instrument to support Rhee’s policies.  
The major cause for the inflation in post Korea War period of the 1950s was 
expansionary government expenditure for the state building and the ISI which was 
financed by the increase in money supply. The US economic aid financed the major part 
of commodity imports, and the macroeconomic implication of this import flow was 
supposed to dampen inflationary pressure.  But instead of containing the massive 
government spending, it ended up with a bulging state structure and a fitful program of 
import-substitution industrialization.  
Table 4 Composition of Economic Aid to South Korea by Type in the 1950s 
(Million US dollars) 
Year Total Grant Loan Others 
1945 1,978 1,153 825 - 
1946 5,465 2,457 3,008 - 
1947 5,709 1,880 3,838 - 
1948 5,270 4,177 1,093 - 
1949 5,651 5,196 455 - 
1950 4,154 4,027 127 - 
1951 4,637 4,518 118 - 
1952 5,043 4,643 400 - 
1953 6,345 6,105 232 8 
1954 5,181 5,092 -114 203 
1955 4,909 4,605 -26 330 
1956 4,951 4,375 18 558 
1957 5,070 4,087 363 619 
1958 4,926 4,010 646 270 
1959 3,923 3,664 4 256 
1960 4,437 3,483 432 522 
 Source: Kim, Taekyoon (2011) 
Taming the rampant inflation of South Korea was another policy concern of the US in 
the 1950s who wanted to have economic stability as well as political stability in South 
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Korea. The priority in the US guideline for South Korea’s economic policy was given to 
stability over the construction of self-sustainable industrial economy. As early as 1950, 
Bloomfield and Jensen drafted Banking Reform in South Korea and demanded that the 
independent central bank be established in order to control strictly the money supply, 
that the central bank stop lending to businesses, and that the commercial banks be 
privatized as soon as possible, and so on. The US envisioned the South Korean 
economy as a free market with the least government intervention.  
Bloomfield and Jensen’s reform proposal, however, was interrupted by the Korean War. 
The implementation of that reform was delayed until 1957. Bloomfield’s suggestion for 
setting up independent and autonomous central bank and liberalizing and privatizing the 
commercial banks was largely ignored by Rhee. It was because Rhee needed to keep the 
Central Bank under his control in order to finance the state building and the ISI. More 
than anything else he needed to keep the economy under his control because his 
political power came from it.  
Rhee’s control over the allocation of aid and import licenses was essential for 
maintaining his political power. President Rhee himself was a frugal protestant. He was 
not much interested in accumulating his personal wealth. But he had ambition to 
maintain his power and to rule the country as long as he could. He created a clientele 
relationship with businessmen by allocating US aid, the license for trade, the 
confiscated Japanese properties, and various monopoly rights on favoritism. Though he 
chose the landed interests as his political ally, he was able to control them instead of 
being controlled by them. It was possible because he owed little to any vested interest 
groups in Korea and was relatively free from their influences. It was not Rhee but his 
political party and his men that received large kick-backs from the businessmen who 
were granted the resources, licenses, or monopoly rights. The money raised in this way 
was used to finance the expenses for running his political party, and campaigning for the 
general election and the presidential election. 
One valuable governing tool that President Rhee inherited from the Japanese colonial 
government is the tightly woven nation-wide public administration system. Even under 
the Lee Dynasty, Korea had a fairly strong centralized administration system and 
bureaucracy. The Japanese colonial government who wished to oversee and control 
every corner of Korea made the administration system far more extensive and effective. 
Both the US military government and the Rhee’s civilian government hired the Koreans 
who had worked for the Japanese colonial government and the Japanese enterprises for 
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the important positions in the government and the businesses to take advantage of their 
experiences.  
The most remarkable achievement of Rhee’s government is the expansion of education 
system. The fraction of the educated in the population of age seven years and older 
increased from 35% in 1955 to 70% in 1960. There was a persistent increase in the 
number of population who acquired the primary and secondary education. Although the 
Japanese colonial government started the infrastructure of common education, it was the 
Rhee’s government that expanded the education system at an explosive rate. Human 
resources of high quality were essential not only for the economic development but also 
for the maturity of political system. This aspect of Rhee’s contribution to the economic 
and political development has not received enough attention.  
Though the average annual growth rate of real GNP in 1954~1960 was 2.6%, Cole et 
al.(1980) estimated that it would have been -1.5% with no US aid, and 0.0% with a half 
of the US aid that Korea actually received. ISI pursued by Rhee was neither systematic 
nor effective for two reasons. First, the US, the major aid donor did not support the 
industrialization of Korea in the 1950s despite its rhetoric; Most of the US aid to South 
Korea in the 1950s was for relief rather than development; The US wanted South Korea 
to be a market for the Japanese industries. Due to this conflict with the US interest, 
Rhee could not implement ISI policies overtly. Second, Rhee did not want to push 
forward the ISI with a well-designed and transparent plan because he needed to avoid 
the public attention in order to allocate the resources and the monopoly rights to his 
political supporters.  
In 1957, the US started to rein Rhee’s government tightly by gradually substituting 
American financial contributions to Korea with training of technical and professional 
personnel, shifting aid structure from grants to earmarked project loans, and eventually 
reducing the amount of aid. This change had dramatically restricted Rhee’s control of 
aid, and consequently the political influence of Rhee and his party faded. Rhee lost his 
maneuverability against the US policy recommendations. He had to comply with the US 
advices on economic policy and the economic liberalization followed. 
Finally, the US succeeded in forcing Rhee to implement Bloomfield and Jensen’s 
‘Banking Reform;’ The supply of currency was frozen in 1957 and in the first half of 
1958; A ceiling was imposed on the government deficit; Korean currency was devalued 
to the level close to the market rate; All the commercial banks were privatized but it was 
14 
 
required that the commercial banks should be approved for loans exceeding 10 million 
won by the government under the scrutiny and guide of the Combined Economic Board. 
Bloomfield’s stabilization program succeeded in stabilizing the inflation. Perhaprs it 
was the only beneficial effect of the reform. The Korean economy slipped into a severe 
recession; private investment became weak; unemployment rate increased sharply; and 
the growth rate of GNP was significantly lowered in 1959 and 1960. The stagnation that 
accompanied the financial reform in 1957 made the Korean economic bureaucrats doubt 
about the effectiveness of the policies recommended by the international agencies, 
especially, those related to the liberalization of the economy and the free market. Later, 
this episode was often quoted by the Korean government as evidence against the similar 
policy recommendations of international cooperation agencies. 
The nation-wide protest against the corrupt authoritarian regime of Rhee burst out in 
April, 1960, as a reaction to the foul play in the presidential election of that year.  He 
resigned from the presidency saying “if people of Korea do not want me, I will step 
down.” This was a symbolic incident that engraved in the mind of Koreans, ordinary 
people and politicians, a strong message that the political power comes from the people. 
It kept the political leaders of Korea from deviating too far away from what people 
needed and wanted. This shared value was an invaluable social asset that many other 
developing countries did not have.  
3) The US Aid to South Korea in the 1960s 
The new direction of the US aid in the late 1950s and the early 1960s presented the 
economic development as the most expedient means to the political ends of the cold war. 
The policy intended to outrace Russia and China economically so that they would give 
up their military expansionism. Behind this policy was Rostow’s developmentalism and 
the Center for International Studies, MIT played a major role. In 1961, the Mutual 
Security Act of 1951 was replaced by Foreign Assistance Act. This policy change had 
put greater emphasis on the private initiative and capital in development, separation of 
military and economic aid. It also had strengthened the US intervention and monitoring. 
The opposition party of Korea criticized that the new aid agreement had dwindled the 
autonomy of economic policies of Koran government. This was about the time that the 
US started to take seriously into account the economic development instead of provision 
of relief.  
Though Bo-seon Yun was elected as the new president in August, 1960, it was the Prime 
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Minister Myeon Chang who was in charge of running the government. Chang prepared 
the five-year economic development plan in order to coordinate the reconstruction 
efforts and improve the efficiency of the resource allocation. In May 1961, however, a 
military coup led by General Chung Hee Park put an end to the Chang’s government. 
The coup succeeded without shedding blood. 
Park was a shrewd and talented survivalist who would take any opportunity in order to 
achieve his goal. He had transformed himself from a school teacher, to an officer of the 
Japanese army, to an officer of the army of the Republic of Korea, to a leader of the 
underground communist faction in Korean army, to the leader of coup, and eventually to 
the president who evangelized anti-Communism and economic development. The 
objectives of the military coup shown in the coup participants’ Six Pledges included 
anti-Communism, strong international relations, anti-corruption, economic 
reconstruction, reunification, and return to a civilian government. (Kim, Hyung-A 
(2004), p.70)  Park treated the priorities of anti-Communism and economic 
development as inseparable prerequisites for national reconstruction. He developed his 
anti Communist stance into a dogma and promulgated it as a precondition for the 
people’s “freedom and democracy.”  His exaggerated anti-Communist stance was an 
attempt to conceal his past as a Communist and he understood clearly that he would win 
the support of the US only if he could convince the US that he was an anti-Communist. 
Park was serious about anti-corruption pledge for strategic reasons. “Clean-up 
Operation,” which Park referred to as a surgical operation, began a week after the coup. 
His ‘purification’ was primarily aimed at getting rid of old politicians and consolidating 
his political power base with members of the new elite from the younger generation. At 
the same time he wanted the competent business leaders to join the band wagon of 
development. Through the Clean-up Operation, he wanted them to be his disciplined 
partners in the international market.  
The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) arrested 51 illicit profiteers, 
4,200 alleged racketeers, and 2,100 suspected Communist sympathizers.  The alleged 
51 illicit profiteers were the leading businessmen of that time. Much of this process was 
symbolic and many of them were soon released.  
Two months after the coup, the SCNR dismissed 6,900 civil servants: 6,700 had evaded 
the military duty and 200 had kept mistresses. Korean Central Intelligence Agency 
(KCIA) investigated 41,712 leading members of the civil service and other government-
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run businesses, and it charged 1,863 civil servants with offenses. The entire civil service 
was under tight scrutiny by the “Joint Investigation Team” led by the SCNR’s 
Inspection Committee on Irregularities of the Public Service. It has been claimed that in 
this process almost one sixth of the entire civil service of 240,000 were dismissed. (Oh 
(1999))  
Gunnar Myrdal argued that it is highly important that the aid-receiving countries to 
clean up the house and establish a responsible political system for the success of the 
development policies.(Myrdal(1984)) From this standpoint, Park’s clean-up campaign, 
even if it was more a bark than a bite, was important for setting the stage of the 
development policies afterwards.  
Facing the political resistance against their illegal military coup, the military faction 
identified their legitimacy with the performances in economic development. The 
continuation of their power hinged on the success in economic development. The drive 
for the industrialization officially started in 1962, one year before Park was elected as 
president, with the announcement and the implementation of “the First Five Year 
Economic Development Plan.” This plan was drafted based on the plan prepared by 
Chang’s government and it also had referred to the three-year economic plan prepared 
by Rhee’s government, and economic planning experiences of India and Egypt. Rhee 
opposed to adopting development planning because he thought that it was a communist 
scheme. But Park was willing to take advantage of it as far as it would be helpful in 
delivering the desired results. Economic Planning Board (EPB) was established and it 
took charge of planning and budgeting.  
Some arguably claimed that the National Civil Service Law in 1963 marked the 
beginning of Korea’s meritocratic bureaucracy where civil servants were promoted on 
the basis of merit rather than seniority. (Lee (1982))  The SCNR had been particularly 
active in recruiting the nation’s outstanding talent to plan and implement economic and 
industrial development programs. Many individuals were recruited from the private 
sector and became the leading technocrats.  
The newly formed Park’s technocracy consisted of two new elite groups: (a) technocrats 
and (b) a blend of former military generals, corporate managers and professional 
administrators.  Three characteristics of these new elite are (i) that they were highly 
qualified professionals with a strong sense of self-discipline and a focus on efficiency 
and achieving goals, (ii) that they had a clear understanding of the essential difference 
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between their bureaucratic managerial power and that of their political masters who held 
ultimate governing power, and (iii) that they had no illusion about Park’s national 
development agenda.  
But they were criticized as follows; (i) They disturbed the traditional value system; (ii) 
They were prone to nepotism and regionalism. The economic bureaucrats of Park’s 
technocracy were divided into two groups, economists of the Economic Planning Board 
(EPB) and the engineer technocrats of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI). 
This division became even more evident in 1967 when the Ministry of Science and 
Technology was spun off from the EPB where only the economists were left. The 
economists in the EPB preferred macroeconomic approach while the technocrats in the 
MCI resorted to microeconomics policies.  Park’s policy preference shifted from EPB 
to MCI, especially so since 1969 when Park began to think that the heavy and chemical 
industrialization was necessary for the self-defense. (Kim, Hyung-A (2004)) 
In 1961, The US made it clear that aid to South Korea would be reduced gradually and 
terminated eventually. By that time around, it was obvious that the assumption of Rhee 
that the US aid would and should continue was not valid any more. Table 6 shows that 
the dependence on foreign resources of capital formation decreased significantly from 
67.6% in the 1950s to 40.7% in the second half of the 1960s. Moreover, in the second 
half of the 1960s, 64.7% of the foreign savings was borrowing, whereas all of the 
foreign resources were grants in the 1950s.   
Table 5 Contribution of Grants to Capital Formation in the 1950s and the 1960s 
 
1953~1961 1962~1966 1967~1969 
Amount 
(billion 
won) 
Share   
(%) 
Amount 
(billion 
won) 
Share   
(%) 
Amount 
(billion 
won) 
Share   
(%) 
Gross Investment 190.0 100.0 578.0 100.0 1,293.7 100.0 
Domestic Savings 57.5 30.3 269.8 46.7 677.7 52.4 
Foreign Savings 128.4 67.6 279.6 48.4 526.0 40.7 
Borrowing - 3.6  - 2.8  55.0  19.7  340.4  64.7  
Transfer 132.1  102.8  224.6  80.3  185.6  35.3  
Source: Bank of Korea, Yearbook of National Income, various years  
South Korea had to establish self-sustained economic system while aid was being 
provided. Because Korea had poor natural resources it was imperative to earn foreign 
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exchange enough to pay for the raw materials and intermediate goods without aid. The 
export-oriented industrialization of Korean economy was a logical and perhaps the only 
solution for foreign exchange procurement problem.  
Another response of Park to the limited financial resources was the adoption of 
unbalanced development strategy of Hirschman (Hirschman (1958)). He would choose 
a few target industries and concentrate the investment in those industries and take 
advantage of the forward and backward linkage effects on other industries. This was an 
important strategic change from the balanced development and the big push, which 
required a huge amount of investment in a short period of time.  
In 1962, the SCNR carried out other emergency measures too. One of them was the 
currency reform announced by surprise. The military faction expected that the currency 
reform would emerge the hidden cash earned by illegal transactions or corruption. Soon 
they realized that there was not much hidden cash and the reform paralyzed the 
economy. The currency reform had been undone in six months. This policy was 
recorded as a blunder of SCNR. 
The SCNR also nullified the Bloomfield-Jensen reform. The commercial banks were 
nationalized again, and the Bank of Korea was brought back under their control. The 
SCNR claimed that the commercial banks should be nationalized because the process of 
privatization under Rhee’s government was corrupt and subject to cronyism. With these 
measures the military faction took control over the financial institutions and was in 
charge of resource allocation. This enabled the government to allocate the resources in 
accordance with their economic policies. Park allocated the resources based on the 
performances of business such as exports rather than the cronyism. Because the 
criterion was clear and transparent there was less room for corruption compared to 
Rhee’s regime. But the practice of giving money to the ruling party continued.   
In order to make up the reduced US aid and to increase the autonomy of economic 
policies, Park was actively looking for the alternative financial resources. In 1965, the 
parliament passed without the participation of the opposition party the bills for 
normalizing the relationship with Japan and for deploying Korean army to Vietnam War. 
As a result, the earnings form Vietnam War and the reparations by Japan became 
important extra financial resource for Korean economic development. 
 
19 
 
Table 6 Ratio of the Revenue from Vietnam to Gross Domestic Product 
(Million US $, %) 
 
Revenue from 
Vietnam including 
US Defense 
Expenditure & 
Korean Exports to 
Vietnam 
Nominal GDP 
Ratio of Revenue to 
GDP 
(%) 
1962-63 96.5 3,192.3 3.0% 
1964-65 104.6 2,826.6 3.7% 
1966-67 209.2 4,163.4 5.0% 
1968 306.6 5,500.0 5.6% 
1969 372.9 6,597.4 5.7% 
Source: Naya, "The Vietnam War and Some Aspects of Its Economic Impact on 
Asian Countries," p.49, recited from Woo (1991), p.94 
The total receipt of Korea from the US for dispatching the troops to Vietnam between 
1965 and 1970 was 927 million US dollars. As shown in Table 6, the revenue from the 
compensation by the US for military engagement in Vietnam and the exports to Vietnam 
was as large as five to six percent of GDP in the second half of the 1960s. Table 7 shows 
that the export to and international transfer from Vietnam accounted for ten to twenty 
percent of total export and transfer in 1966~1969. Just as Korean War spurred the 
reconstruction of Japanese economy in the early 1950s, Vietnamese War made a 
significant contribution to the economic development of Korea.  
Table 7 Korean Earnings from Vietnam, 1966-1968  
(US $ million) 
 
1966 1967 1968 
Commercial Exports 13.8 7.3 5.6 
Military Goods Sales 9.9 14.5 30.8 
Construction and Service Contracts 12.3 43.5 58.4 
Remittances       
Civilian 9.7 40.6 38.4 
Military Goods Sales 13.2 30.0 34.4 
Others 0.0 8.8 4.6 
Total Earnings from Vietnam (A) 58.9 144.7 172.2 
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Total Receipts from exports of goods and 
services plus private transfers (B) 
558.0 744.8 993.0 
Ratio of Total Earnings from Vietnam to 
Total Exports and Transfers (A/B) 
10.6% 19.4% 17.3% 
Source: Cole and Lyman (1971), Korean Development, p.135 
Another important financial source was the reparations made by Japan. The US had 
urged Korea to normalize the diplomatic relationship with Japan from 1948 on, which 
Rhee had opposed adamantly. Scars were still fresh and Korean people in general were 
not ready to reopen the relationship with Japan. Despite the protest of the people, Park 
normalized the relation with Japan. The price tag was 500 million US dollars, 300 
million as grants and 200 million as loans. These reparations, called the Property and 
Claims Fund, were highly useful because they were not earmarked. This fund was 
invested in the projects such as the construction of steel mills in Pohang, which the 
developed countries and the international agencies thought was unrealistic nonsense.   
The US approved immediately the SCNR a few days after the coup. President Kennedy 
sent a message to Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) on 20 May 
1961, confirming the friendship and cooperation between Korea and the US. This shows 
that the US was more interested in the Cold War politics of containing the expansion of 
Communism than the domestic politics of Korea’s establishing a democratic 
government.  The immediate US acquiescence in Park’s military coup would further 
encourage him to plan his future political ambitions, mainly by positioning himself as a 
caretaker of the Cold War political paradigm instructed by the US. 
Park, who wanted to have autonomy in economic policies, undertook these measures 
without consulting the US. Even though the US had become more serious about the 
economic development of Korea in the 1960s, there was a constant tension between 
South Korea and the US regarding the economic policies just as it had been under 
Rhee’s government. The US criticized that the First Five Year Economic Plan was more 
like a wish list or a shopping list.  
The US consistently put more weight on stability than growth. The experts of the US 
and the international agencies always expressed their concern about the high inflation 
rate of Korea, but they were not so enthusiastic about propping the high growth rate. 
The US demanded that the First Five Economic Development Plan should be toned 
down by lowering the goal of the growth rate to a more plausible level. Facing 
21 
 
criticisms both from inside and outside, the plan had to be radically revised in mid-1964, 
lowering the target average annual growth rate from average 7.1% to 4.3%. However, it 
turned out that the average annual growth rate during the First Five-Year Plan period 
was higher than the original goal. This was another episode that raised doubts about the 
relevance of advices of the US experts.  
Another consistent advice of the US experts was to minimize the government 
intervention in the market and to let the prices, including interest rates and exchange 
rates be determined by the forces of market. The implementation of currency reform and 
the nullification of Bloomfield-Jensen reform by surprise in 1962 outraged the US. In 
1965 the US tried to remedy what they saw as damage by the financial reform drafted 
by Gurley, Patrick, and Shaw. Because the US withheld aid, Park implemented only 
reluctantly the financial reform by increasing the deposit and loan interest rate by 10%.  
The reform was merely partial and short-lived. First, Park did not change the monetary 
system and policy at all and the high inflation continued. Second, even if the real 
interest rate on deposits and general loans increased to a positive level, the nominal 
interest rate on the special policy loans such as export loans, foreign exchange loans, 
and the special fund Industrial Bank loans remained so low that the real rate of interest 
for those loans was still negative. (See Table 8.) Moreover, in 1970 the ceilings on the 
deposit and loan interest rates were brought back.  
Table 8 Structure of interest rates for various types of loans in 1969 
Type of Loans 
Nominal 
Interest Rate 
Export Loan 6.0 
Foreign Exchange Loan 7.5 
Capital Expenditure   
  Special Fund Industrial Bank 7.5 
  General Fund Industrial Bank 10.0 
Minor Enterprise (Government Fund) 11.0 
Minor Enterprise (Self Fund) 15.0 
Working Capital   
  Industrial Bank of Korea 18.0 
  Commercial Bank Loan 24.0 
  Commercial Bank Discounts 24.6 
Source: Economic Statistics of Korea, recited from Yasuda, Ryuji (1979), p. 117 
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3. Aid Effectiveness in South Korea and Lessons for Developing 
Economies 
Because the donor of aid to South Korea was predominantly the US government, 
‘harmonization’ was not an issue in case of South Korea. This also means that the US 
government was in the position to make influence on the economic policies of South 
Korea. Actually, they tried to set the direction of the economic policies of Korea, 
whenever it is necessary or possible. It should be noted, however, that the priority of the 
US policy for Korea had always lied in containing the Communism rather than the 
economic development.  
In 1950, the Korean War broke out. It was an eruption on the cold war frontier, a clash 
between the Communist and the capitalist region. It was an extremely disastrous war, 
both in terms of casualties and the damages to the properties. This unfortunate event 
revitalized and actually intensified the US interest in Korea. The US perceived South 
Korea as a forward defense state against the Communist, a buffer for the East Asian 
region, especially Japan.  
The political stability within Korea was also critically important in the context of the 
US Asian policies in 1950s. Both the role of containment frontier and the maintenance 
of domestic stability required a strong state. A strong state that was supported by the US 
would easily be an authoritarian regime. The US could not help being ambivalent about 
the democratic freedom in Korea. Because the US had huge stake at blocking the 
expansion of the Communism, however, the Korean political leaders had a certain 
degree of bargaining power in designing policies as far as they commit firmly to the US 
anti-Communist strategies. In general, Korean leaders exercised that bargaining power 
very actively. 
An authoritarian government is capable of controlling not only the security but also the 
economy. Korean leaders took the initiative in designing and implementing the 
development policies by actively intervening in the market. But it is little doubt that 
Park took the initiative for economic development more actively and effectively. In this 
sense ownership of aid management was strong in South Korea in general. 
Almost all the aid was officially provided and a large fraction of it went through the 
account of Bank of Korea or the government budget. Based on this observation, we may 
well say that the US aid was aligned well to the need of Korea. But it is clear that the 
US and Korea had different ideas of how to utilize the aid. In the 1950s, the US was 
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interested in relief and macroeconomic stability but was not much interested in 
industrializing Korean economy. In 1950s Rhee wanted to pursue the import 
substitution industrialization. The conflict on the development policies was minimized, 
because Rhee’s ISI proceeded covertly. In 1960s the US became more serious about 
Korea’s economic development. But the US still put the macroeconomic stability above 
the development. And aid was tied up to projects. It is hard to tell whether the US aid 
was more aligned to Korean needs in the 1960s.  
In 1950s, aid management in Korea was not directly related to the measurable results. 
However, the resources were used for the state building and the expansion of education, 
which became precious asset for the succeeding governments. It should be also noted 
that the ISI under Rhee regime played an important role when export oriented 
development strategy was employed by Park’s government.  
As the economic development planning was introduced and the government adopted a 
clear performance criterion of export performances in the 1960s, the management and 
the allocation of aid became tightly linked to the result bearing activities.  Though the 
US also wanted Korea to deliver results, the performance measure was somewhat vague 
because it placed the macroeconomic stability and free market system over the 
development performances.  
Accountability had also improved in the 1960s as the management became more 
transparent and the corruption-inflicted practices were cleaned up. In addition, the 
report of evaluation of economic development plans provided excellent review on 
success and failure of the aid management. The US government also compiled the data 
and information about the aid management in Korea in order to report to the parliament 
and get the approval for the new aid.   
Table 9 Aid Effectiveness of South Korea in the 1950s and the 1960s  
á la Paris Declaration 
 Harmonization Ownership Alignment 
Management 
for Results 
Accountability 
1950s N/A Moderate Moderate Weak Moderate 
1960s N/A Strong Weak Strong Strong 
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We may well conclude that the recipient was more effective than the donor, and the aid 
management improved significantly in the 1960s compared to the 1950s. The aid 
effectiveness in the 1950s and the 1960s coincides roughly with the economic 
performance of the corresponding decade. Average annual growth rate of real GDP was 
2.6% in 1954~1960, and 7.9% in 1961~1970.  
Figure 2 Real GDP Growth Rate, South Korea, 1954~1970, (%) 
 
Source: Bank of Korea 
Although the growth performance was not impressive in the 1950s, there was an 
important achievement in this period. The fraction of educated population dramatically 
increased from 34% in 1955 to 70% in 1960. This did not provide the qualified labor 
force necessary for industrialization, but also created the educated citizens who could 
check and monitor the politicians in the process election. It must have been more 
difficult for the political leaders to fool the educated citizens in the election.  
Figure 3 Share of Educated Population in South Korea in the 1955~1970, (%) 
 
Source: Census, various years 
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Figure 4 shows that the share of manufacturing in GDP increased significantly in the 
1950s from 9.8% to 14.5%, even though Rhee was not able to implement the 
industrialization policies in systematic and coordinated manner.  Industrialization in 
this period must have been a valuable step stone for the economic development in the 
following decades. In the 1960s, industrialization picked up speed and the share of 
manufacturing output in GDP reached 20% by 1970.  
Figure 4 Industrial Structure of South Korea in the 1952~1970, (%) 
 
Source: Bank of Korea 
The urbanization was a mirror image of industrialization which attracted rural 
population to the urban areas where the industrial facilities are located. Urbanization 
progressed considerably from 18% in 1950 to 23% in 1960. Urbanization is important 
because it is a process through which the underemployed labor force is absorbed by the 
industrial sector.  
Figure 5 Urbanization in South Korea in the 1949~1970, (%) 
 
Source: Census, various years 
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What the developing countries should learn from Korean experiences may not be the 
conformity to the Paris Declaration itself, but the reason why the leaders made such 
decisions and the technocrats earnestly follow the lead. The confrontation with North 
Korea and the presence of the US armed forces in the territory had been double edged. 
On the one hand, they contributed to the political stability by preventing the political 
leaders of Korea from crossing the line in pursuit of their personal ambition or greed. 
The leaders of South Korea had to compete with the regime in North in order to win the 
support of the citizens and at same time they were constrained by the policy guidelines 
of US who provided South Korea with aid for security and food, that is, the very 
existence. Although the two regimes in the 1950s and the 1960s were authoritarian, they 
were not as violent or murderous against the civilians as in many other developing 
countries. These circumstances also prevented the military elite from abusing the armed 
forces in order to hold the power.  
Meanwhile the containment policy was a constraint to the US. The US had to acquiesce 
with the Korean development policies as far as Korea committed to blocking the 
expansion to Communism. This prevented the US from withdrawing aid to Korea 
because the Korean government had not complied with the US policy guidelines. For 
this reason Korea was able to enjoy the sovereignty of fiscal and monetary policy 
despite the constant pressure of the US. For instance, in order to mobilize the resources 
necessary for industrialization projects, both Rhee and Park take advantage of the 
inflation tax. For instance, the average annual inflation rate was 18.2% in 1955~1960, 
and 17.8% in 1961~1970.   
Figure 6 Inflation Rate (GDP deflator), South Korea, 1955~1970, (%) 
 
Source: Bank of Korea 
Only in 1960, the inflation rate fell below 10% as a result of Bloomfield-Jensen reform. 
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Park did not reduce the money supply even when he was forced to implement the 
Gurley-Patrick-Shaw financial reform in 1965 and the inflation rate stayed above 15% 
in the second half of the 1960s.  
The extensive administration system and the disciplined and well-trained bureaucrats 
and technocrats are another important factor to which we can attribute the successful 
management of aid. Historically, Korea had had a centralized administration system in 
the Lee Dynasty and the Japanese had strengthened and expanded it even further in 
order to control the country. Rhee inherited this sophisticated and strong administration 
device and the experienced personnel.  
The SCNR had been particularly active in recruiting the nation’s outstanding talent to 
plan and implement economic and industrial development programs. Many individuals 
were recruited from the private sector and became the leading technocrats. Three 
characteristics of Park’s new elite are (i) that they were highly qualified professionals 
with a strong sense of self-discipline and a focus on efficiency and achieving goals, (ii) 
that they had a clear understanding of the essential difference between their bureaucratic 
managerial power and that of their political masters who held ultimate governing power.  
4. Are the Korean Experiences Applicable to Uganda? 
Uganda became independent in 1962. Since independence, Uganda had been highly 
unstable politically. Out of eight changes in the government four were achieved by 
military forces. The violence against the civilians was so severe that there hardly exits 
any parallel case. Many attribute the political instability to the ethnic and religious 
divisions in Ugandan society and to the socially divisive colonial tactics adopted by the 
British.  
When the UK imposed the federal constitution in 1962 it recognized four kingdoms and 
24 ethnic groups and tried to reflect the diverse ethnic structure of the Ugandan society. 
The first government of independent Uganda was formed by an alliance of southern and 
northern political parties. Under this alliance, the traditional king of Buganda was 
elected as president while Milton Obote became prime minister. In 1966, however, 
Obote suspended the federal constitution and declared himself executive president, with 
the support of Army. As a dictator, dependent on army, Obote destroyed the significant 
autonomy of various kingdoms and districts. He pursued a one-party state, which 
caused factional conflicts.  
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His efforts to secure popular support were not successful and in 1971 he was deposed in 
a military coup led by Idi Amin. After Obote fled to Tanzania, Amin and his army, most 
of who are from northern Kakwa group, attacked the Langi, which is Obote’s tribe. 
Indiscriminate killings took place. Amin, who is Muslim, also persecuted Christians. It 
is estimated that about 300,000 people were killed in the seven-year period. In 1979 as 
Tanzanian army invaded Uganda Amin fled abroad. After a short period of confusion, 
Obote came back to power winning the presidential election in 1980.  
Obote depended on the support of army (Uganda National Liberation Army, UNLA). 
His regime failed to unite the factions in Ugandan society. As National Resistance Army 
(NRA) led by Yowery Museveni became the focus of opposition, UNLA attacked NRA 
and a large number of the civilian Baganda were killed. Obote’s second presidency did 
not last long. Dissent between Langi and Acholi grew deeper, and finally in 1985 Acholi 
occupied Kampala and seized power. This time Obote fled to Zambia. Obote’s 
government was replaced by the Military Council led by General Tito Okello.  
But in 1986, NRA led by Museveni took over Kampala after fierce fighting. Museveni 
was sworn in as president and a National Resistance Council (NRC) was formed to take 
charge of government. At first, Museveni established a system of elected resistance 
council at the local level, in a determined effort to promote grass-roots democracy. Party 
political activities were banned. This is the system called ‘National Resistance 
Movement(NRM).’ A new constitution, which ensures that the “movement system” 
takes precedence over traditional political representation, was drafted in 1994. In 1996 
Museveni won the first presidential election under the new constitution. A referendum 
was scheduled in 2000 to determine whether or not to continue the “movement system.” 
Finally, in the referendum in 2005, the constitution was amended and the multiparty 
political system was brought back in place. Museveni won the presidential election 
again in 2011 and he continues to hold the power.  In the parliament, the National 
Resistance Movement is the dominant party.  
For decades, Uganda's economy suffered from devastating economic policies and 
instability. Uganda is one of the poorest countries in the world. In 1990 per capital GDP 
was 205 US dollars, and in 2009 it reached 404 US dollars (in 2005 constant prices). 
Per capita GDP of Uganda in 2009 is about the same level as per capital GDP of Korea 
in 1955.  
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Figure 7 GDP per capita of Uganda in the 1990~2009, (2005 US$) 
 
Source: World bank 
The country had commenced economic reforms and growth has been robust in the 
1990s and the 2000s. Between 1990 and 2001, the economy grew at 6.9% on average 
because of continued investment in the rehabilitation of infrastructure, improved 
incentives for production and exports, reduced inflation and gradually improved 
domestic security. In 2001~2009, the average annual real growth rate of GDP was 7.2%. 
In 2008, Uganda recorded 8.2% growth despite the global downturn and regional 
instability. However, ongoing Ugandan involvement in the war in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, corruption within the government, and slippage in the 
government's determination to press reforms raise doubts about the continuation of 
strong growth. 
Figure 8 Real GDP Growth Rate, Uganda, 1990~2009, (%) 
 
Source: World bank 
Economic growth has not always led to poverty reduction. Despite an average annual 
growth of 5.9% between 2000 and 2003, poverty levels increased by 3.8% during that 
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period. This has highlighted the importance of avoiding jobless growth and is part of the 
rising awareness in development circles of the need for equitable growth not just in 
Uganda, but across the developing world. 
Uganda has many emigrants – residing mainly in the United States and the United 
Kingdom. These emigrants have contributed enormously to Uganda’s economic growth 
through remittances and other investments (especially property). According to the 
World Bank, in 2010/2011 fiscal year Uganda received $694 million in remittances 
from Ugandans abroad, which amount to 4.4% of GDP. This is one of the most 
important sources of foreign exchange for Uganda.  
Museveni’s regime had stabilized the economy remarkably. Inflation ran at 240% in 
1987, 42% in 1992, 6.8% in 1994, and was 5.1% in 2003. Average annual inflation rate 
in 1990~1999 was 14.9%, but it decreased to 6.4% in 2000~2009. From 1994 on 
Uganda has been enjoying high annual growth and stable inflation rate.  
Figure 9 Inflation Rate (GDP deflator), Uganda, 1990~2009, (%) 
 
Source: World Bank 
Even though the economy grows at a healthy rate, there is no sign that the economy is 
being industrialized. The share of the manufacturing in GDP is stationary around 10% 
over the two decades of 1990~2009. The share of agricultural output decreased to 25% 
in 2002, but recently it has bounced back to 38%. The share of the services moves in the 
opposite direction to that of agriculture.  Given the low level of income, it is highly 
likely that the service sector consists of the subsistent self-employed vendors.  
No progress in industrialization is related to stagnant urbanization. During the two 
decades of the 1950s and the 1960s, the fraction of the urban population remained 
around 13%. Because the rural areas in developing countries are usually inflicted with 
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underemployment problem, the stagnant urbanization is another sign of jobless growth 
in Uganda.  
Figure 10 Industrial Structure of Uganda in the 1990~2009, (%) 
 
Source: World Bank 
Figure 11 Urbanization in Uganda in the 1990~2009, (%) 
 
Source: World Bank 
Since the introduction of Universal Primary Eucation in 1996, the enrollment rate of 
primary education has increased darmatically. However, the enrollment rate of 
secondary and tertiary eudcation is still very low. If Uganda wants to accumulate human 
and social capital it is very improtant that the more active investment should be made in 
the secondary ad tertiary education. Educational investment seems essential in 
improving the capacity of the country in terms of the quality of labor force and the 
political maturity of citiziens.  
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Figure 12 Gross School Enrollment Rate in Uganda in 1990~2008, (%) 
 
Source: World Bank 
Uganda is a highly aid dependent country, with aid averaging over 10% of GDP and 
half of public expenditure. The majority of aid is provided as grants, although loans 
make up approximately 40% ob-budget aid.  Uganda has had highest sustsined flows 
of budget support of developing countries. (IDD and Associates (2006)) In case of 
Uganda, the two major donors are the World Bank and the European Union. In the 
1990s aid and external support has in various forms helped support the generation and 
implementation of the policy reforms. When the government first rejected in 1986 and 
then reluctantly introduced market-based reforms in 1987~1992, policy dialogue, 
advisory services, training and technical assistance were of critical importance both for 
decisions to reform and the direction of the reforms. When Ugandan government 
decided to reform reluctantly in the late 1980s, the financial aid and conditionality 
became the main and the most powerful cause for the reforms. The major substance of 
reforms in this period was the capacity building of the public sector. 
However, since 1992 with secured government ownership, conditionality became less 
relevant for inducing reforms. The Ugandan authorities have mainly chosen pro-
developmental and poverty reducing strategies in addition to good macro-economic 
policies. These included the introduction of Universal Primary Education, and the 
drafting and promulgation of a home grown constitution.  
Holmgren et al. (1999) point out that Ugandan experiences indicate that the focused and 
coherent aid programs improved the performance of government and private sector 
performances and that the institutional capacity is a very important determinant of 
implementation success. A series of reforms enhanced the administrative infrastructure 
considerably.  
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The Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) oversees 
planning, budgeting and accounting systems and processes, as well as aid management 
systems and processes. In 2003, the National Planning Authority was established, since 
then it has been responsible for drafting the poverty reduction strategy. The Directorates 
of Economic Affairs and Budget in the MFPED manage macroeconomic, fiscal policies 
and the budget process, while the Accountant General is responsible for compilation and 
management of government accounts and custody and the safety funds and resources. 
Local Governments are responsible for preparing and approving their own budgets but 
earmarked conditional grants limit their autonomy over resource allocations. Uganda 
has a well established Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and consultative 
budget process. In 1998, the sector-based MTEF was introduced and much of aid 
coordination has been focused on institutions and mechanisms at the sector level. This 
system used to be praised as good practice, but recently it has begun to slip in timeliness 
and quality. (Williamson (2008))  
Nevertheless, integrating project aid into MTEF and budget documentation helps 
improve the comprehensiveness and strategic nature of decision making in the budget, 
whether or not parliament appropriates aid. Instead of creating parallel mechanisms 
through projects and basket funds, sector budget support can be channeled through an 
intergovernmental transfer system in support of local service delivery.   
In 1990s, poverty was reduced remarkably. But in the 2000s, there were ups and downs. 
Poverty level increased to 38% in 2003 from 34% in 2000, and the Gini coefficient 
increased from 0.35 in 1997/8 to 0.43 in 2003. The reason for the recent pattern includes 
a decline in agriculture without no better alternative provided. (IMF (2005)) 
Economic policy of Uganda focuses more on poverty reduction rather than economic 
development. Though households are moving out of relying solely on crop farming into 
non-agricultural enterprises, wage employment is expanding more slowly. In regard to 
human development, recent years have seen major improvements in education and 
literacy.   
What part of Korean experience is applicable to Uganda? There is little doubt that one 
of the main ingredients for the success of South Korean economy is the role of the 
government that initiated and coordinated the economic development at least at the 
earlier stage. This aspect of South Korean experiences is in sharp contrast with the 
experiences of many other developing countries, where the government failure, from 
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corruption to murderous dictatorship, is far more detrimental than the market failure.  
In 2004 the Korea Development Institute, supported by the Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance, launched the Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP), which is basically a 
provision of consultation to the government of a developing country, which requests a 
solution for a specific problem it faces. The KSP recommendation usually puts the 
government at the center of the scene on the implicit assumption that the government of 
the developing country has a strong administrative capacity to implement the 
recommended policies. Of course, this implicit assumption stems from the experiences 
of Korea which is characterized by a strong, reliable, and effective bureaucracy that had 
developed throughout the Lee Dynasty and had strengthened even further during the 
colonial period. But it should be noted that many developing countries today do not 
enjoy the same strong administrative capacity even today. Considering such difference, 
one should not expect that the government of other developing countries play the 
leading role as actively as did the government of South Korea. One may well doubt that 
the KSP recommendations, formulated on the assumption that there is a strong and 
effective government, are applicable to the developing countries whose government is 
weak and ineffective. In this sense KSP policy recommendations are not much different 
from the neoliberal policy recommendations from the experts of advanced countries that 
the developing countries should leave the resource allocations to the market even 
though no reliable market system has matured yet in many developing countries.  
Uganda also has weak government apparatus compared to Korea in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Ugandan government is more decentralized and the local governments are highly 
unorganized and incompetent.  This is part of the reason why it is so difficult to collect 
taxes in Uganda. Delivery of resources and implementation of policies through local 
governments can also be a problem. Tensions and conflicts among kingdoms and tribes 
are a serious obstacle in making a comprehensive and coordinated plan.  
After a long period in power, Museveni’s government produces scandals of corruption. 
This government is not strong enough to draft and implement a nation-wide 
development project. Although capturing aid on budget has progressed, the fragmented 
project aid is still a problem that stands in the way of orchestrated national development. 
It has to do with the structure of aid donors. The majority of aid is multilateral and 
comes from diverse sources. It is far more difficult to coordinate the stream of aid and 
make it stable.  
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Another obstacle to Ugandan development is the lack of disciplined high-quality 
bureaucrats and technocrats. Only recently the primary education has become universal 
but still there is not enough investment in secondary and higher education.  
Ugandan armed forces may be a potential risk factor for Uganda. We cannot exclude the 
possibility of military coup. In the case of Korea, the confrontation with North Korea 
and the presence of the US armed forces restricted the unruly actions of the military 
personnel. In case of Uganda, there is no such brake.  
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